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WILLS FORMALITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD*
Individuals have executed wills the same way for centuries. But over
time, traditional requirements have relaxed. This Article makes two
principal claims, both of which disrupt fundamental assumptions about the
purposes and functions of wills formalities. First, the traditional
requirements that a will must be in writing and signed by the testator in the
presence of (or acknowledged before) witnesses have never adequately
served their stated purposes. For that reason, strict compliance with
formalities cannot be justified by their cautionary, protective, evidentiary,
and channeling functions. Reducing or eliminating most of the long-standing
requirements for execution of a will is consistent with the true purpose of
wills formalities-authenticating a document as the one executed by the
testator with the intention of having it serve as the binding directive for the
post-mortem distribution of the testator's property.
This Article's account has important implications for the way that
legal scholars, lawmakers, and lawyers think about wills. The Article's
second claim is that the substantive standard of the harmless error rule-that
the decedent intended a particular document to be the decedent's last will
and testament-should be the only threshold that must be satisfied for a
court to admit the document to probate. Widespread adoption of such an
intent-based rule is preferable to one that is overly formalistic. Current
formalism leads both to false positives (i.e., grant of probate to a document
not intended by the decedent as the decedent's will) and false negatives
(i.e., denial of probate of a document clearly intended by the decedent as
the decedent's will). An intent-based rule would make more likely the valid
execution of wills by poor and middle-income individuals who typically
cannot or do not consult attorneys. An intent-based standard also sets the
stage for widespread recognition of electronic wills, if states are able to
address concerns about authentication, fraud, and safekeeping of electronic
documents. Technological developments could make estate planning in the
twenty-first century more accessible than ever before to people of all wealth
and income levels if the legal profession is prepared to embrace new ways
of executing wills.
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INTRODUCTION
Testicle gripping had solemn significance in ancient pre-Roman
times.' When a man took an oath, the action's importance was
underscored by the equally memorable act of publicly holding either his
own or another man's genitals.2 In early Bavaria, a legally completed
transfer of real property required the conveyor to hit a young boy on
the side of the head.' In England in 1677, the Statute of Frauds required
certain legal agreements, particularly those relating to the transfer of
land, to be in writing; signed by the transferor or by someone else in
the testator's presence and at the testator's direction; and attested to and
subscribed by the testator, all within the presence of "three or four
credible witnesses."' Anecdotal evidence suggests that across cultures
and time, some sort of ritual accompanies significant acts.
In the case of the important act of transferring property at death,
the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds (1677) and UK Wills
Act (1837) served as the model for much state legislation in the United
States.' Part I of this Article describes the evolution of wills formalities
from strict adherence to the requirements to the ultra-forgiving
harmless error rule of the Uniform Probate Code.' It also explores
other ways-short of full embrace of the Uniform Probate Code's
1. See Joshua T. Katz, Testimonia Ritus Italici: Male Genitalia, Solemn
Declarations, and a New Latin Sound Law, 98 HARV. STUD. CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 183
(1998). Katz demonstrates that it is no coincidence that the Latin word testis has the
dual meaning of both "witness" and "testicle." Id. at 186-89, 193.
2. Id. at 193.
3. See Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Form and Formalism: A Case Study, 31
AM. J. COMP. L. 627, 627 (1983), cited in James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55
ALB. L. REv. 1009, 1033 (1992).
4. An Act for Prevention of Fraud and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c.3
(Eng.).
5. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES
143 (10th ed. 2017); see also infra Section I.A.1.
6. See infra Section I.A.
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harmless error rule-that some states have become more accepting of
wills that do not strictly comply with traditional wills formalities. For
example, some states embrace holographic wills and their partial
revocation by physical act,7 or the use of interested witnesses that
otherwise would not be tolerated at common law.
Part H evaluates these departures from strict compliance with wills
formalities in light of the stated functions of those formalities. Typically
scholars describe the Wills Act formalities as serving multiple
purposes, e.g., an evidentiary function; a channeling function; a
cautionary (or ritual) function; and a protective function.9 Among trust
and estate lawyers, professors, and students, it has been accepted
almost as an article of faith for centuries that following the prescribed
procedures will most likely lead to the execution of a will that reflects
the testator's authentic and final desires with respect to the distribution
of property. Yet given how decisively the majority of states have
adopted one or more flexible rules for wills formalities, there is reason
to question whether some (or any) of the formalities ever served a
substantially meaningful purpose.o This Article suggests that the law of
wills formalities might be better understood as rooted in concerns about
authenticity-i.e., that a particular document is the one that the
decedent intended to be her will. The formalities do not in fact provide
adequate evidence that some theoretical purposes of wills formalities
have been served.'
When viewed through the lens of American law's underlying
policy commitment to the freedom of disposition,12 it becomes clear in
Part III that the law should embrace relatively simple rules for the
execution of a will. The only necessary requirement should be that the
document is authentic, meaning that this is the document the decedent
executed, and that the decedent intended the document to function as
her last will and testament. As long as the document's authenticity is
uncontested, there is no reason to demand rigid adherence to wills
formalities that are hundreds of years old. Up until now, the law has
addressed will authentication issues through clumsy doctrines. Overt
embrace of a minimal authenticity rule would be more consistent with
what courts actually do to probate wills that otherwise do not meet
7. See infra Section I.B.1.
8. See infra Section I.B.2.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("The organizing principle of the
American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition. Property owners have the
nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.").
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formal requirements in jurisdictions that have not yet embraced the
harmless error doctrine of the Uniform Probate Code.
Part III provides a critique of harmless error and endorsement of
authenticity as the most appropriate standard for evaluating a will's
validity. First, there is no evidence that traditional wills formalities
have reduced litigation, and so it is appropriate to question why the
formalities should be honored.' 3 In other words, the requirement of a
writing by the testator who acknowledges his or her signature or signs
in the presence of two or more witnesses does not seem to prevent
contestants from raising claims about facially defective execution of a
will or an underlying problem related to the conditions under which the
will was executed, such as lack of mental capacity, fraud, undue
influence, or duress.14 Given that fact, then witnesses would appear to
be insufficient, although perhaps helpful, for purposes of providing
evidence about the authenticity of the document or the testator's state of
mind." The second reason to endorse relaxed requirements for will
execution is that fewer formalities will increase the likelihood that
individuals can execute valid wills without lawyers. Legal services are
expensive and make estate planning out of reach for people of modest
or limited means. In the context of the larger access to justice
movement, the ability to plan for the future, even if one has few assets
to transmit at death, can be an important source of personal agency and
psychological comfort.' 6
Part IV considers the future of wills formalities in light of this
Article's proposal that all wills shown to be authentic should be
admitted to probate. Against the backdrop of the law's anemic
commitment to the policies allegedly served by requiring wills
formalities in the first place, the time is ripe for reform. Any change to
the law most certainly will need to account for the primacy of digital
communication and recordkeeping in the twenty-first century."
Although not yet common practice, it is reasonably certain that
electronic testamentary documents will become more widespread. If an
electronic will can be authenticated as a decedent's last will and
testament, there is no reason to deny probate. In developing a coherent
set of rules for authenticating electronic wills, emerging technologies
need to be taken into account.
This Article concludes with a roadmap for how the law should
address some of the concerns about authentication of both traditional
and electronic wills through the use of open distributed ledgers, to
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Section I.A.2.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part IV.
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name just one possible innovation in electronic record-keeping.
Whether the law can and will change to accommodate the changes in
twenty-first century modes of communication, documentation, and data
storage depends in large part on whether lawyers themselves are willing
to change. As time-honored as is the traditional will execution
ceremony conducted in an attorney's office, typically with a will
printed on bond paper and bound ceremoniously with a ribbon (or not),
that ceremony is not inherently any more reliable, justified, or correct
than oath-taking accompanied by genital holding, or land conveyances
effectuated by hitting children. Embracing relaxed requirements for will
execution expands access to justice.
I. EVOLUTION OF WILLS FORMALITIES
Whether a will is valid or not is a matter of state law." Each state
has particular rules for the formalities that must be satisfied for a
document to be accepted as a decedent's last will and testament.19
Generally speaking, common throughout the United States are the
requirements that the document be in writing, signed by the testator and
attested by witnesses." Each state may require additional formalities
that must be satisfied for the document to be recognized as a valid
statutory will. 2' If not so recognized, then depending on the
jurisdiction, there may be three (or more) other routes for validating the
document as a will. The state may permit notarized wills (a document
attested in the presence of a notary, but without any witnesses) or
holographic wills (an unsigned document written entirely or in large
part in the testator's own hand).22 Or the state may deploy some form
18. See, e.g., In re Estate of Jung, 109 P.3d 97, 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)
(stating in dicta that will creation is a statutory right); 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 48 (2013)
(affirming that the ability to dispose of property and the means for doing so are matters
of state law).
19. Compare, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1(a)(4)
(LexisNexis 1974) (witnesses do not have to be present together), with N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 551:2 (2018) (witnesses must be present together).
20. For a quick comparative overview of state law requirements for wills and
citation to each state's applicable statutes, see NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAW, WILLS
(Richard A. Leiter ed., 7th ed. 2015),
https://heinonline.org/HOL/NSSL?collection=nssl&law=WILLS&edition= 7.
21. See, e.g., id.
22. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 31-3.4 (West 2012) (requiring
holographic will to be written "entirely in the handwriting of the testator"), with S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-502 (2018) (recognizing a holographic will if "the signature
and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting").
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of a curative doctrine to "forgive" any failure to meet certain of the
statutory formalities.23
A. The Traditional Formalities
1. ENGLISH AND UK PRECEDENTS
The English Statute of Frauds, enacted in 1677, required that
certain agreements, especially relating to the transfer of land, were
binding only if made in writing; signed by the transferor or by someone
else in the testator's presence and at the testator's direction; and attested
to and subscribed by the testator, all within the presence of "three or
four credible witnesses." 24 Different (and less rigorous) rules applied to
dispositions of personal property at that time.25 Only the 1837
enactment of the UK Wills Act brought harmony to the requirements
for the disposition of real and personal property by will. 26 Under the
Wills Act, a valid will could dispose of both real and personal property
if it was in writing, signed at the end (or "subscribed") by the testator
or someone else at the testator's direction and in the testator's presence,
and attested and signed in the testator's presence by two or more
witnesses who were present together.27
Historically the requirements of the Wills Act were strictly
construed in most jurisdictions. Consider, for example, the infamous
case of Charles Groffman who, together with his wife, was socializing
at home with two other couples.28 Mr. Groffman decided that particular
evening was a convenient time to have witnessed his last will and
testament, so he invited his friends and guests Julius Leigh and David
23. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 72-2-523 (West 2017) (holding
document not complying with statutory formalities validly executed "if the proponent of
the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence" that the decedent
intended the writing to constitute the decedent's will). One cannot necessarily count on
a curative doctrine, however. Compare In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1339-40
(N.J. 1991) (probating will where testator mistakenly signed a stand-alone affidavit but
not the page of a will containing language indicating that the testator intends to execute
simultaneously the will and a self-proving affidavit), with In re Will of Ferree, 848
A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003), aff'd, 848 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004) (per curiam) (denying probate of a signed and notarized will that lacked
witnesses). New Jersey has subsequently adopted the more flexible harmless error
statute. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3B:3-3 (West 2018).
24. An Act for Prevention of Fraud and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c.3
(Eng.).
25. Wills Act 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (requiring that a transfer of land be made
by a "writing," with no requirement of signature by the testator or witnesses, and
permitting transfer of personal property by oral or written will).
26. Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26 § 9.
27. Id.
28. In re Groffinan [1969] 1, W.L.R. 733 (P), 1069 WL 26902.
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Block to serve as witnesses to the will he had already signed and had in
his jacket pocket.2 9 Mr. Groffman and Mr. Block left the lounge and
went together to the dining room, where Mr. Block signed the will as a
witness.30 Mr. Leigh, however, continued to enjoy the company in the
lounge for a few more minutes and joined Mr. Groffman in the dining
room only after Mr. Block had returned to the lounge." Mr. Groffman
acknowledged his signature to Mr. Leigh; Mr. Leigh signed as a
witness.32 After Mr. Groffman died and his will was presented for
probate, the issue was whether the formalities of the Wills Act of 1837
were satisfied, given the fact that Mr. Block and Mr. Leigh were not
together in the dining room at the same time and had not seen each
other sign the will as witnesses. Although the deciding judge declared
that he was "satisfied that the document does represent the testamentary
intentions of the deceased," he went on to say that judicial duty
required a finding that "there was no acknowledgment or signature by
the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the
same time," and thus the will could not be probated.33 Strict adherence
to the wills formalities prevented recognition of a document that Mr.
Groffman undoubtedly intended to be his will.
In the United States, the UK Statute of Frauds (1677)' and the
Wills Act (1837)35 served as the basis for most state legislation, 6 with
some jurisdictions adding further formal requirements.3 7 Although a
few states continue to require rigid adherence to the presence or
subscription requirements, most states have loosened in some way the
requirements of wills formalities.38
2. DEPARTURES FROM WILLS FORMALITIES
In 1975, Professor John Langbein of Yale Law School published
Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, an article that became the
29. Id. at 735.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 736.
34. An Act for Prevention of Fraud and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c.3
(Eng.).
35. Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26 § 9.
36. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony: History,
Significance and Strategies, 29 S. TEx. L. REv. 413, 418-19 (describing Statute of
Frauds and Wills Act as basis for U.S. law).
37. See, e.g., N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1(a)(3) (McKinney
2006) (requiring "publication" of a will by the testator).
38. See infra Section I.A.2.
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foundational scholarship on wills formalities.3 More than forty-five
years after its publication, that article continues to be excerpted in
twenty-first century law school casebooks.' Langbein wrote that "the
insistent formalism of the law of wills is mistaken and needless."41
Langbein proposed departing from wills formalities under a substantial
compliance doctrine where failure to meet any of the statutory
requirements would trigger a two-pronged inquiry into whether the
document expressed the decedent's intent and whether its form
"sufficiently approximate[d] Wills Act formality to enable the court to
conclude that it serves the purposes of the Wills Act." 4 2 Citing prior
work by Fuller, 43 Friedman," Gulliver, 45 and Tilson," Langbein listed
and described what by then had become accepted as the traditional
functions of wills formalities: the "cautionary" (or ritual) function;4 7 the
protective function;" the evidentiary function;49 and the channeling
function.' To the extent that a court was satisfied that these purposes
were served, Langbein argued, a technically non-compliant will should
be admitted to probate.5 ' In Langbein's view, the minimum
requirements for a valid will were a writing and the testator's
39. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv.
L. REV. 489, 489 (1975) ("The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and relentless
formalism.").
40. See, e.g., SrrKOFF & DUKEMINER supra note 5, at 145-46.
41. Langbein, supra note 39, at 489 (observing that upon finding of formal
defect in compliance with formalities, "Anglo-American courts have been unanimous in
concluding that the attempted will fails").
42. Id.
43. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Fonn, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799
(1941).
44. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead:
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 340.
45. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1951); see also infra note 137 and accompanying
text.
46. See id.
47. Langbein, supra note 39, at 495 ("One purpose of many of the forms is
to impress the testator with the seriousness of the testament . . . ."). Fuller also used
the phrase "cautionary function." Fuller supra note 43, at 800. Friedman does not use
the phrase "cautionary function," but describes formalities as impressing upon the
testator "the solemnity of his acts." Friedman, supra note 44, at 367. Gulliver and
Tilson use the term "ritual" function to refer to the same concept. See Gulliver &
Tilson, supra note 45, at 4.
48. Langbein, supra note 39, at 496.
49. Id. at 492 ("The primary purpose of the Wills Act has always been to
provide the court with reliable evidence of testamentary intent and of the terms of the
will. ").
50. Id. at 494 (stating that if formalities are followed, "[c]ourts are seldom
left to puzzle whether the document was meant to be a will").
51. Id. at 515-16.
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signature.52 Otherwise, he saw no reason to invalidate a will for what
were essentially minor errors in execution.5 3 To take one easy example,
under Langbein's proposed doctrine, Mr. Groffman's will would be
valid.
Langbein's tremendously practical and useful doctrine essentially
functions as an interpretory preference. In place of a conclusive
presumption of invalidity in cases of imperfect compliance with wills
formalities, in Langbein's view, the law should have a rebuttable
presumption of invalidity that can be overcome with evidence of intent
of the testator and satisfaction of the purposes of the Wills Act.54
Langbein argued, in essence, for the possibility "of harmless error in
the execution of wills," something otherwise not recognized by the
courts," yet his views became known under the banner of "substantial
compliance," in keeping with the article's title."
In the same year that Langbein's article appeared, the state of
South Australia adopted an even more progressive approach to
defectively-executed wills." Instead of requiring the will proponent to
show that the purposes of formalities were satisfied when strict
formalities were not, South Australia opened the door for a defectively
executed will to be probated as long as the proponent could show
merely that the decedent intended the document to be his will. Over
six years after passage of that South Australia statute, the Australian
state of Queensland enacted a law that was closer to Langbein's original
substantial compliance vision than the South Australia law had been.
The Queensland law provided that a will could be probated if it
"substantially complied" with wills formalities."
In 1987, Langbein published his study of how the implementation
of the (looser, harmless error) South Australia rule compared with the
implementation of the (stricter, substantial compliance) Queensland
rule.? He concluded that the South Australia rule was more forgiving,
52. Id. at 498.
53. See id. at 489, 515-16.
54. Id. at 513.
55. Id. at 489.
56. See Langbein, supra note 39, and accompanying text.
57. See S. Austl. Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1975 (SA) s 9, amending
Wills Act of 1936, 1938 (SA) s 12(2).
58. Id.
59. See Succession Act of 1981 (Qld.) s 9(a).
60. Twelve years after the publication of his Substantial Compliance article,
Professor Langbein published the results of his study of the application of the
substantial compliance in the Australian states of Queensland and South Australia. John
H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on
Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1-2, 52-53
(1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors]. Langbein notes that the
approach he articulated in the 1975 Substantial Compliance article, supra note 39, had
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as courts were quick to excuse failure to meet most signature or
attestation requirements. 61 Langbein suggested approvingly that the only
"indispensable" formality under the South Australia approach appeared
to be a writing.62 Langbein seemed persuaded by the wisdom of the
South Australian approach, thus embracing an evolution from the
substantial compliance test he first articulated in 1975 to the looser
harmless error test for validating otherwise defectively executed wills.
Like Langbein, Professor James Lindgren believes that the only
wills formalities that are indispensable are that the will must be in
writing and must be signed by the testator. 63 He would abolish entirely
the attestation requirement (i.e., the necessity for two or more
competent individuals to sign as witnesses or to acknowledge the will
and circumstances surrounding its execution).' Lindgren argues that
such a change would modernize wills formalities and bring them in line
with those that apply to nonprobate transfers.' Given the rising
importance of non-probate transfers in estate planning,' according to
Lindgren there is no reason for one set of execution rules to apply to
testamentary transfers and a different set of rules to apply to non-
probate transfers that are probate substitutes.
Lindgren and others have suggested that substantive doctrines of
fraud, undue influence, and capacity are better suited than formalities
for separating "good" wills from "bad" ones.' Lindgren in particular
has advocated for the elimination of the attestation requirement, based
on the erosion of the requirement of disinterested witnesses, as well as
little impact in the United States. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra, at 8-
10.
61. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 60, at 16-18, 22-24,
52.
62. Id. at 52 (explaining that under South Australia statute, courts excused
non-compliance with formalities because "[olf the three main formalities-writing,
signature, and attestation-writing turns out to be indispensable").
63. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement, 68 N.C. L.
REV. 541, 542 (1990) [hereinafter Lindgren, Abolishing Attestation].
64. Id. at 541-43 ("Abolishing the attestation requirement for formal wills
would bring their formalities more in line with the formalities required for other ways
of passing property at death . . .
65. Id. at 543.
66. Id. at 542 (describing the "rise of nonprobate transfers" as one that
destabilizes the claim of the importance of wills formalities).
67. Id. at 566-67 (explaining methods for correcting mistakes in documents
effectuating non-probate transfers of property).
68. Id. at 555-56 ("[O]ther substantive doctrines are designed to protect the
testator-not only the laws against fraud, duress, and undue influence, but also the law
of capacity. . . . These substantive doctrines are much better suited for separating
coerced wills from uncoerced wills.").
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the rise of holographic wills. 69 Pointing to the thousands of reported
cases in which an intended will failed because of an innocuous defect in
witnessing, 70 Lindgren noted that the presence of witnesses does not
guarantee that the will is untainted by fraud or undue influence. 71 He
would apply lower standards of proof to witnessed wills, without
automatically invalidating a will that lacks witnesses.72 If Lindgren's
proposal were adopted and attestation were not required, then there
would be little need for either the substantial compliance doctrine or the
harmless error rule.
B. Informal Becomes Normal
The Uniform Probate Code, adopted in whole or in part by at least
eighteen states,73 is far less stringent than the Wills Act when it comes
to the execution of wills. Under UPC § 2-502(a), a will must be in
writing;" it must signed by the testator or in the testator's name by
someone else in the testator's conscious presence and at the testator's
direction;" and the document must either be acknowledged by the
testator before a notary public7 6 or signed by at least two individuals
"each of whom signed within a reasonable time after the individuals
witnessed either the signing of the will . . . or the testator's
acknowledgement of that signature or acknowledgment of the will,"
without any requirement that the witnesses be present together while the
69. See James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1009, 1028
(1992) (arguing against the need for any witnesses); see also infra Sections I.B.1 &
I.C.
70. Lindgren, Abolishing Attestation, supra note 63, at 542 n. 15 (citing over
2000 appellate cases listed in the treatise, W. BowE & D. PARKER, 2 PAGE ON WILLS §§
19.73-19.149 (3d ed. 1960)).
71. Id. at 573 ("Wills lacking attestation are not usually tainted by fraud or
undue influence. And wills with attestation are not necessarily freely made.").
72. Id. at 572 (stating preference for "easier proof in court for attested
wills"). Adam Hirsch's analysis of comparative scholarship on wills formalities is
especially helpful in considering this topic. See Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing
Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797,
800-12 (2014).
73. Probate Code, UNW. L. COMM'N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=a539920d-c477-44b8-84fe-b0d7bla4cca8
[https://perma.cc/UN5S-X77G] (displaying map and table tracking states that have
enacted the Uniform Probate Code).
74. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N amended 2010)
(requiring will to be in writing).
75. § 2-502(a)(2) (requiring testator to sign or permitting another person to
sign in the testator's name if done so in the testator's conscious presence and at
testator's direction).
76. § 2-502(a)(3)(B) (permitting notary public to take testator's
acknowledgment, without requirement of additional witnesses).
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testator signs or acknowledges the will." By following these rules,
replete with all attendant formalities, a testator produces what is
typically called a "statutory will."" Yet statutory wills are not the only
kind of valid will under the Uniform Probate Code or specific state
law. The Uniform Probate Code and states that have adopted it take a
broad approach and recognize many types of documents as valid wills.
The Uniform Probate Code and adopting states forgive or even
overlook failure to comply with the rigorous (or relaxed) requirements
for valid will execution.
1. HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
The Uniform Probate Code specifically recognizes as a valid will a
document that does not meet the formalities specified under UPC § 2-
502(a), as long as the signature and "material portions" of the
document are in the testator's handwriting." Typically unwitnessed,
such a document commonly is called a "holographic" will. Even states
that have not adopted the Uniform Probate Code in whole or in part
may permit holographic wills under particular circumstances. In New
York (a non-UPC state), for example, holographic wills must be
written entirely in a decedent's own hand80 and are valid only when
made by certain individuals in particular situations (e.g., a member of
the armed forces of the United States while in actual military or naval
service during a war or other armed conflict, a person who serves with
or accompanies an armed force engaged in actual military or naval
service during a war or other armed conflict, or mariners at sea), 8' and
77. § 2-502(a)(3)(A) (permitting will to be signed by at least two witnesses).
78. See, e.g., GENERAL PRACTICE SECTION, AM. BAR Ass'N, ALL-STATES
WILLS AND ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 1-1, 1-4 to 1-5 (1993 ed.) (describing four types
of wills as statutory, holographic, nuncupative and military).
79. § 2-502(b) ("A will that does not comply with subsection (a) is valid as a
holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the
document are in the testator's handwriting."). Jurisdictions have considered in many
different factual scenarios what constitutes the "material portions" of a purported wil.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Krueger, 529 N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D. 1995) (defining
material portions as "relevant," "consequential," or "having a certain or probable
bearing . . . on the effect of an instrument"); In re Estate of Muder, 765 P.2d 997,
1000 (Ariz. 1988) (permitting probate of a fill-in-the-blank form will as having
"material portions" in the decedent's own handwriting where decedent completes
blanks with the names of his intended beneficiaries).
80. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.2(a)(2) (McKinney 2006) ("A
will is holographic when it is written entirely in the handwriting of the testator, and is
not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities prescribed by 3-2.1.").
81. § 3-2.2(b) (delineating three groups of people who may validly execute a
nuncupative or holographic will).
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only for a limited time period.8 2 Pennsylvania, in contrast, makes no
distinction between holographic wills and wills executed in accordance
with greater formalities (such as witnesses).83 Under Pennsylvania law,
the only requirements are that a will must be in writing and signed by
the testator." In Pennsylvania, it is legally insignificant whether some,
all, or none of the will is written in the testator's own hand; it may be
entirely typed, entirely handwritten, or any combination of both.
2. OTHER NON-TRADITIONAL WILLS
Somewhat surprisingly, the Uniform Probate Code does not
recognize nuncupative, or oral, wills.' Nor does the UPC relax
execution requirements for wills of active duty military personnel.87 It
does, however, permit wills to be notarized in lieu of having two
witnesses; this adds certain flexibility to the otherwise formal
requirements for wills." The failure of the UPC to recognize
nuncupative wills or loosened requirements for military wills is not a
significant obstacle to creating a valid will, given its otherwise
capacious and forgiving approach to any failure to comply with the
strict statutory requirements.89
C. Tolerable Conflicts
An "interested witness" is someone who stands to benefit under a
will, most typically as a named recipient of some or all of the testator's
property.' In some jurisdictions a person also is deemed to be an
interested witnesses if nominated as executor or as trustee under the
will." Traditionally, if one of a will's necessary witnesses were
82. § 3-2.2(c) (a nuncupative or holographic will becomes invalid within
certain time after occurrence of particular events).
83. PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (form and execution of a will).
84. Id. (stating "[e]very will shall be in writing and shall be signed by the
testator at the end thereof," subject to further rules regarding text following the
signature or testators unable to sign their own names to the will).
85. See id.
86. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N amended
2010) (recognizing as valid wills only those documents executed in accordance with
requisite formalities unless instrument is holographic will or valid in jurisdiction where
executed).
87. Cf., e.g., supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
88. See § 2-502(b) (will may either be witnessed by two individuals or be
notarized).
89. See infra Section I.B. 1.
90. See Witness - Interested Witness, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014) ("A witness who has a direct and private interest in the matter at issue.").
91. Id.
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"interested," then a court would invalidate the entire will, on the
grounds that it had not been properly witnessed.' A "purging statute"
enacted in the United Kingdom in 1752 mitigated these harsh results,93
and similar purging statutes were adopted in many U.S. states.
Currently most states have some variation of them.95 The impact of
such a purging statute is to treat as valid any will with an interested
witness, but to require that witness to forfeit some or all of the transfers
to him or her.'
The Uniform Probate Code permits an interested witness to sign a
will and does not require any forfeiture by the interested witness of a
portion of a bequest or devise.' The comment to UPC § 2-505
indicates that as of 1990 (when the comment was written), the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws believed that the
presence or absence of witnesses historically had little or no impact on
deterrence of fraud or undue influence. 98 For that reason, the UPC
allowed interested witness and instead treated a substantial testamentary
transfer to an interested witness as a suspicious circumstance that might
give rise to an undue influence claim, but not a bar to inheritance."
The UPC's more casual approach to interested witnesses is not
unexpected, because the primary authors of the revisions to Part 2 of
the 1990 UPC were Professor Langbein and Professor Lawrence
92. See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 45, at 11-12 (describing
common law rule on interested witnesses to a will). Later that rule was softened by
permitting probate of a will with an interested witness, as long as there were a
sufficient number of disinterested witnesses. See, e.g., Katheleen R. Guzman, Where
Strict Meets Substantial: Oklahoma Standards for the Execution of a Will, 66 OKLA. L.
REv. 543, 566 (2014) (describing supernumerary rule).
93. 25 Geo. 2, c. 6 § 1 (1752).
94. JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2018 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING
tbl. 1 (providing citations to each state's law concerning interested witnesses, among
other topics).
95. Id.
96. States vary widely on their approach to interested witnesses; the
interested witness may forfeit all, none or some of the devised or bequeathed property.
Compare, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-134(b) (2018) (interested witness may receive under
will) with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-258 (2018) (providing that all devises to
interested witness are void unless witness is an heir or supernumerary), with ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-25-102(b) (2018) (non-supernumerary interested witness forfeits any
transfers that, in aggregate, exceed the value of that interested witness's intestate share,
had the decedent died intestate).
97. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-505, cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N amended 1990)
(witness's status as "interested" does not impact validity of will or disposition).
98. Id. ("The requirement of disinterested witnesses has not succeeded in
preventing fraud and undue influence; and in most cases of undue influence, the
influencer is careful not to sign as a witness, but to procure disinterested witnesses.").
99. Id. (naming substantial devise to interested witness as a "suspicious
circumstance").
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Waggoner.100 Recall that Langbein had advocated for relaxed wills
formalities in his 1975 Substantial Compliance article.o10 He also served
on the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code.102
Waggoner served as that project's Director of Research; he was well
known for advocating for reformation of wills doctrines.o As one
fellow law reformer contemporaneously described Langbein's and
Waggoner's important roles in the 1990 UPC, "[tiheir law review
articles and other writings have demonstrated the need for this constant
review and revision. There is no doubt that the most recent draft of
article II [of the UPC] clearly reveals their pervasive influence and
draftsmanship.""
D. Harmless Errors
The provision of the UPC with the greatest impact on wills
formalities is the harmless error rule of UPC § 2-503.o" This rule
operates to excuse any defect in execution as long as the document's
proponent can provide by "clear and convincing evidence" that the
decedent intended the document to operate as a will, a partial or
complete revocation, or an alteration or revival of a previously revoked
will.'" Although the official comments make clear that "the larger the
departure from [the statutory formalities], the harder it will be to satisfy
the court that the instrument reflects the testator's intent,""0 7 mistakes
that appear to be forgiven frequently include lack of witnesses or other
100. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the
1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 891, 898 (1992) (referring to Langbein's
appointment to the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code).
101. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 39.
102. Averill, supra note 100, at 897-98.
103. Id. at 898 (mentioning Waggoner's role as Director of Research of the
Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code). Together, Langbein and
Waggoner had advocated for open recognition of reformation of wills, in departure
from the strict no-reformation common law tradition. John H. Langbein & Lawrence
W. Waggoner, Refornation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in
American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 521 (1982).
104. Averill, supra note 100.
105. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N amended 2010).
106. Id. (stating that non-conforming will may be probated if: "the proponent
of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the document or writing to constitute (1) the decedent's will, (2) a
partial or complete revocation of the will, (3) an addition to or an alteration of the will,
or (4) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will or of a
formerly revoked portion of the will").
107. § 2-503 cmt. (emphasizing section's intent-serving aims).
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problems with attestation.'" The stated rationale for this lenience is that
attestation "makes a more modest contribution to the purposes of the
formalities."' By this comment, the Restatement drafters appear to
admit that witnesses play a comparatively lesser role in serving the
purposes of wills formalities: the cautionary, ritual, protective, and
channeling functions."o To understand the harmless error doctrine,
then, it is imperative to ask the next question: witnesses to a will make
a "more modest contribution"'" to wills formalities in comparison to
what other persons or factors?
Apart from witnesses that meet specific performance and presence
tests, consider the two other fundamental requirements for statutory
wills. The testator must sign the document and the document must be in
writing." 2 If the harmless error rule of UPC § 2-503 excuses the
absences of witnesses or other errors in attestation, query whether the
failure of a testator to sign a document could be considered a "harmless
error." The answer appears to be yes. In a relatively recent New Jersey
case, a client prepared for her attorney notes about how she wanted her
estate to be distributed." 3 The attorney then prepared a draft in
accordance with the client's notes, but the provisions of the draft did
not precisely mirror the notes." 4 The attorney may have been seeking
to translate the client's wishes into clearer or more flexible dispositive
language that the attorney planned to discuss with the client."'
Unfortunately, the client died without having reviewed or signed the
draft will." 6 Some of the decedent's relatives sought to have probated
either the client's notes or the unsigned draft."'
Working with a harmless error-type statute, the trial court and the
appellate court denied probate of the client's notes as a holographic
will"' and also denied probate of the unexecuted draft will." 9 The New
108. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1135-36 (Mont. 2002)
(joint will may be probated without necessary number of witnesses because attorney had
advised clients that his notarization was sufficient).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAw INST. 2003).
110. See supra Section I.A.2.
111. See § 3.3 cmt. b.
112. See supra note 20 and infra note 141 and accompanying text.
113. In re Estate of Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1262-63.
118. Id. at 1264 (denying probate of the client's handwritten notes on the basis
that they were unsigned).
119. Id. at 1263-65 (distinguishing between evidence that decedent intended to
change her will from evidence that she intended a draft document to serve as her will).
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Jersey Superior Court recognized that it was the first appellate court in
that state to interpret the harmless error statute. 120 The court self-
consciously referred to its decision as "plow[ing] this virgin soil guided
by our jurisprudential experience and mindful that, in addition to
discerning the intent of the Legislature, a court's duty in probate
matters is to ascertain and give effect to the probable intention of the
testator. "121 The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's denial of
probate on the grounds that it was not clear that the decedent intended
this particular draft document to serve as her will because she never
had the opportunity to review it and assent to it. 122
Surprisingly, though, for a court conscious about plowing "virgin
soil,"1 23 the Superior Court opinion went on to say in dicta that "we are
satisfied that a writing offered [not as a holographic will, but an
otherwise non-conforming statutory will] need not be signed by the
testator in order to be admitted to probate. "124 Thus there is at least one
state, New Jersey, that appears to suggest that even the testator's own
signature is not an essential component of a will. The New Jersey
Superior Court does not provide any rationale, however. One possible
interpretation is that the testator's own signature is not absolutely
necessary for serving the purposes of wills formalities-the cautionary,
ritual, protective, or channeling functions.12 5
The commentary to the Restatement calls the lack of signature on a
will "the hardest [of defects] to excuse."l2 6 Although such a defect is
"serious," it is not "insuperable." 12 7 The commentary cites as an
example of a case in which lack of signature might be most easily
excused the situation in which a wife mistakenly signs the husband's
will and the husband mistakenly signs the wife's will. 128 Implied in such
a scenario is that each testator had read and approved the intended wills
(presumably "mirrors" of each other), but then signed the wrong
document.
120. Id. at 1263.
121. Id. at 1263-64 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
122. Id. at 1264-65 (interpreting the harmless error statute to require the
proponent to prove "by clear and convincing evidence [] that: (1) the decedent actually
reviewed the document in question; and (2) thereafter gave his or her final assent to it.
Absent either one of these two elements, a trier of fact can only speculate as to whether
the proposed writing accurately reflects the decedent's final testamentary wishes").
123. Id. at 1263.
124. Id. at 1266.
125. See supra Section I.A.2.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
127. Id.
128. Id. ("A particularly attractive case for excusing the lack of the testator's
signature is a crossed will case, in which, by mistake, a wife signs her husband's will
and the husband signs his wife's will.").
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II. FORMALITIES AS ANTI-LITIGATION DEVICES
This Part II explores in greater detail the origins and variations in
formal wills requirements and then turns to consider the rationales for
having any traditional requirements for wills formalities.' 29 The
multiple statutory exceptions to strict compliance with wills formalities
suggest that the commonly accepted and often-cited policy reasons for
requiring wills formalities may not be compelling enough to demand
continued adherence to traditional methods for executing a valid will.'30
If that is true, then different and more lenient rules would facilitate the
validation of a greater number of authentic wills.'31
In Consideration and Form, an article published in the Columbia
Law Review in 1941, Professor Lon Fuller attempted to parse the
difference between form and substance in legal doctrine, specifically in
the context of transfers with and without consideration (i.e., contracts
and gifts).132 Citing legal giants including British legal positivist John
Austin,1' American legal realist Karl Llewellyn,'34 and British legal
positivist (and advocate of utilitarianism) Jeremy Bentham,'" Fuller
129. See infra Part I.
130. See infra Part ll.
131. Such rules might include recognition of electronic wills. See, e.g., NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 133.085 (West 2017) (permitting electronic wills). But see
generally Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for
Wills to Join the Digital Revolution?, 33 Omo N.U. L. REv. 865, 890-86 (2007)
(describing multiple obstacles to the widespread adoption of electronic wills); Michael
Millonig, Electronic Wills: Evolving Convenience or Lurking Trouble, 45 EST. PLAN.
27, 29 (2018) (cautioning that "[c]areful consideration should be given before changing
the traditional method [of signing a will] to an electronic format. Unless there has been
some dramatic change in society or the law justifying deletion of this exception, there is
no reason to bring the signing of a will into electronic commerce").
132. See Fuller, supra note 43.
133. See id. at 800 n.4 (quoting John Austin, Fragments-On Contracts, in 2
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 939-44 (4th ed., London, John Murray 1879) for
proposition that legal formalities provide "evidence of the existence and purport of the
contract, in case of controversy").
134. Id. (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931) on functions of legal formalities). Llewellyn's
view of contract formalities was that "[flormal acts of the known type then signify
openly definitive intent to change the existing situation-and to be relied on." Llewellyn
supra, at 711.
135. Fuller, supra note 43, at 800 n.4 (citing Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale
of Judicial Evidence, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 64-86, 508-85 (John
Bowring ed., 1843)). Bentham's view was that evidence could be divided into three
categories-real, oral, and written-and that written evidence operates
to establish the genuineness of the document . .. to make it appear, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that the document exhibited as containing the
discourse expressed by a certain person on a certain occasion, does really
contain the discourse of that same person; and (where the occasion is
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identified three principal functions of legal formalities: an evidentiary
function (preserving a written record), a cautionary function (causing
the transactor to take the transaction seriously), and a channeling
function (forcing the transactor to take actions in a format that would be
interpretable easily by a deciding judge, because the form of the
transaction resembled similar transactions of that nature).136
In 1941, Ashbel Gulliver, the Dean of Yale Law School, together
with Yale Law School instructor Catherine Tilson, extended Fuller's
work by applying to wills Fuller's analysis of the function of contract
and gift formalities.1 3 7 In their article Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, Gulliver and Tilson evaluated the formalities that courts
treated as important in determining whether a particular transfer would
be recognized as a valid testamentary transfer. 138 Where Fuller saw
three functions-evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling-in
contractual formalities, Gulliver and Tilson reconsidered and
rearticulated the distinct purposes served by strict application of wills
formalities. First, Gulliver and Tilson explained, requiring the testator
(or some other person on the testator's behalf and at the testator's
direction) to sign the will served a ritual function (a different name for
Fuller's cautionary function), insofar as a transfer effectuated by
multiple attendant formalities likely correlated with deliberation and
intentionality on the part of the testator."'
Second, as Fuller found with contractual formalities, Gulliver and
Tilson understood wills formalities to serve an evidentiary function."*
A will's written nature, the presence of disinterested witnesses, and the
testator's affixing her signature, especially at the end of the will, all
served to preserve the physical proof of the testator's motivations and
material) that this discourse did really issue from him on that same
occasion.
Bentham, supra, at 120.
136. Fuller, supra note 43, at 799-801 (describing evidentiary, cautionary and
channeling functions of formalities governing the execution of contracts).
137. See, e.g., Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 45, at 3-5 (explaining that "the
court needs to be convinced that the statements of the transferor were intended to
effectuate a transfer," that the presented proof of this intent is reliable, and that
safeguards protected the transferor from "undue influence or other forms of
imposition"). For more information on these authors' collaboration, see, Adam J.
Hirsch, Gulliver and Tilson, 'The Classification of Gratuitous Transfers' - A Belated
Review, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 127 (2016).
138. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 45, at 3-5.
139. Id. at 4 ("Mhe general ceremonial precludes the possibility that the
testator was acting in a casual or haphazard fashion.").
140. Gulliver and Tilson noted, however, that, "this purpose is not
accomplished in every case, since all of the attesting witnesses may become unavailable
to testify because of death or some other reason, and their unavailability will not defeat
probate of a will." Id. at 8.
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increase the likelihood that some person would be available after the
transferor's death who could testify as to the testator's clear
testamentary intent and actions.' 4 ' Presumably the rationale was that an
eyewitness would be able to testify that the document had not been
tampered with, and that the testator undertook certain acts with
testamentary intent. Potential problems might arise if one or more of
the witnesses were not available (or alive) to testify when the will
eventually was probated.14 2
The third function of wills formalities as articulated by courts,
according to Gulliver and Tilson, was the protective function; they did
not consider this especially justified or well-served by the presence of
witnesses.' 43 The competency of witnesses could be questioned, their
presence may or may not have served as deterrents to malfeasance by
others, and there was no reason to think that testamentary transfers
needed more "protection" from bad actors than inter vivos transfers."
Yet witnesses were required for wills, but not for lifetime gifts, they
noted.'45
Gulliver and Tilson went on to argue that some jurisdictions'
recognition of holographic wills as valid suggested that the main
"work" of wills formalities was to provide evidence of what the
decedent intended.'" If Gulliver and Tilson were correct, then perhaps
the only truly significant formality was that the testator's wishes be
committed to writing.1' And only for testators in the most extreme
circumstances-those on their deathbeds as well as active military
personnel-were those requirements relaxed.'
141. Id. at 8. Nevertheless, the court placed significant value on eyewitness
testimony in probate cases, and so the presence of witnesses increased the likelihood
that someone would be available to testify as to the actions taken. Id.
142. Id. at 6 ("f[The testator will inevitably be dead and therefore unable to
testify when the issue is tried. Secondly, an extended lapse of time, during which the
recollection of witnesses may fade considerably, may occur between a statement of
testamentary intent and the probate proceedings.").
143. Id. at 9 ("Some of the requirements of the statutes of wils have the
objective, according to judicial interpretation, of protecting the testator against
imposition at the time of execution. This is difficult to justify under modem
conditions.").
144. Id. (explaining that makers of wills are "likely to be among the more
capable and dominant members of our society").
145. Id.
146. Id. at 13 ("The exemption of holographic wills from the usual statutory
requirements seems almost exclusively justifiable in terms of the evidentiary
function.").
147. Gulliver and Tilson treat the restricted availability of nuncupative
testamentary transfers as indicating the prime importance that courts place on the
evidentiary function served by formal wills. Id. at 14-15.
148. Id.
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In 1966, legal historian Lawrence Friedman explored the interplay
between social values and the law of succession in The Law of the
Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society,
published in the Wisconsin Law Review.14 9 He brought particular focus
to the way in which the general principle of freedom of testation exists
in tension with the laws governing wills, insofar as "[t]he wills statute
admits of no exception, and none will be engrafted on the law by the
courts.""'o In other words, in Friedman's analysis, wills formalities
served to restrict testamentary freedom."' Far from being content with
an historical explanation for the legal system's rigid adherence to wills
formalities, Friedman inferred that the absence of a "swift tide running
against formality" necessarily meant that wills formalities served some
social utility or value. 15 2 Notwithstanding the growth of middle-class
estate planning in the nineteenth century, Friedman inferred that wills
formalities persisted because lawyers understood them and insisted
upon them."' Friedman did not critique wills formalities as
inappropriate constraints on testamentary freedom.1 54
Without citing or referring to the work of Fuller,"'5  Austin, 156
Llewellyn, 1 5  Bentham," Gulliver," 9 or Tilson,160 Friedman labeled
wills formalities as having ritual, evidentiary, protective, and
channeling functions, without naming them as such, as well as
providing an incentive to engage lawyers for a procedurally facile post-
149. Friedman, supra note 44, at 340 (making overarching claim that "every
major field of law is concerned in some way or other with reproducing social values in
succeeding generations," and then exploring this proposition in the specific context of
the law of gratuitous transfers).
150. Id. at 365 (explaining that formalism operates as a type of restriction on
absolute freedom of testation).
151. Id. (describing the conflict between testamentary freedom and wills
formalities in three distinct areas: formalities for due execution, limited discretion of a
court to limit statutory rights to succession such as the elective share right, and the
probate (legal) process that must be followed after death in order for transfers to be
treated as valid, for example).
152. Id. at 366 ("[W]e should resist seductive use of history as a substitute for
an explanation. . . . We must therefore look for forces within the social system that
maintain formality in being.").
153. Id. at 367 ("Formalism survived when the lawyers of the day were
capable of understanding and perpetuating it.").
154. Id. ("[T]he formalism which survived was functional. The formalities of
executing a will are useful ones.").
155. Supra note 132; see also supra note 136 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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mortem disposition of assets."6 ' The larger social value served by these
formalities was a legal system that is "smooth, uniform, and efficient,"
a goal that Friedman and most other scholars would find worthy
indeed, 16 2 but one that certainly supported the legal profession as well.
III. FORGIVENESS AS THE BEST FRAGRANCE FOR WILLS16 3
In many states, the law governing wills formalities has moved
gradually from the strict compliance required by the Wills Act" to
forgiving errors in execution, as long as the will meets the cautionary,
ritual, evidentiary, and channeling purposes of wills formalities.1 65 The
Uniform Probate Code permits even greater variation from traditional
wills formalities, allowing for holographic wills not entirely in the
decedent's own handwriting," notarized wills," and wills with
interested witnesses who are not required to forfeit any part of a
testamentary transfer to them.'6 Indeed, the Uniform Probate Code has
relaxed the formalities required for will execution so much that it
appears that the absence of witnesses, the testator's signature or even a
writing might be excused, as long as there is clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent intended a particular memorialization to
constitute the testator's will.169
Given that the Uniform Probate Code and state statutes modeled
after it have all but eviscerated the traditional wills formalities, there is
good reason to doubt that the primary motivation for those formalities
were fully (or even adequately) described as having cautionary, ritual,
evidentiary, and channeling functions.170 To be sure, the legal system
has an interest in ensuring that testators take the process of will
execution seriously, are protected from the influence of potential
malfeasors, provide clear evidence of their intent to make a final
transfer, and execute documents that courts can readily identify as last
161. Friedman, supra note 44, at 367-68 (judging formalities as useful
because they "impress the testator with the solemnity of his acts; they ensure a standard
written document, duly filed in court, recording the orderly disposition of goods and
rights; they eliminate most of the danger of forgery and fraud; they encourage the use
of middlemen (lawyers) who can help plan a rational, trouble-free disposition of assets.
. . . It may be all the more important that the documents be standardized in form.").
162. Id. at 368.
163. The phrase "forgiveness is the fragrance that the violet sheds on the heel
that has crushed it," has been attributed to Mark Twain, but may have other origins.
164. See supra Sections I.A.1-2.
165. See supra Section I.B.
166. See supra Section I.B.1.
167. See supra Section I.B.2.
168. See supra Section I.C.
169. See supra Section I.D.
170. See supra Section I.B.
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wills and testaments. Yet the fact that many wills formalities are
relaxed (or abandoned) suggests the value of an economic analysis-
i.e., whether the benefits associated with any given formalities are
worth the costs associated with complying with them. In other words,
what wills formalities truly seek to do is to balance the possibility of
false positives (i.e., the mistaken determination that a particular
document or memorial is a decedent's will) against the possibility of
false negatives (i.e., denying probate to a document or writing that
clearly was intended by the decedent as a final expression of wishes for
the post-mortem distribution of the decedent's property).
On the whole, the strict requirements of the Wills Act and statutes
modeled after it"' reflect a preoccupation with-or priority given-to
preventing false positives. The underlying reasoning is that unless the
testator truly intended a particular document to be a will, a testator
would be unlikely to go through the trouble of writing one (or directing
the preparation of one), signing the document at the end (or having
someone else sign it at the testator's direction and in the testator's
presence) with two or more witnesses who attest and sign in the
presence of the testator and each other.17 2 Yet the cost of rigid
adherence to these wills formalities are false (and clearly unjust)
negatives-the denial of probate to an instrument, such as the will in
Grof)5nan,' where the court has no doubt that the decedent intended
the document to be his will. 174
Overall, the relaxing of the requirements for a statutory will under
UPC § 2-502(a) to the bare minimums of a writing, signature and
witnesses17 1 would have the effect of reducing the number of false
negatives without increasing the number of false positives. In that
sense, this provision of the UPC is a salutary reform that merits serious
consideration by states that have not yet adopted it. By parity of
reasoning, generous application of the harmless error rule617
accomplishes the same result of minimizing false negatives. It is not
clear, though, that law reform needs to stop there.
The standard for authenticity should be simple: Was this the
document signed by decedent and intended to be his or her will? In
phrasing, the test is similar to the harmless error rule but emphasizes
authenticity. Authenticity, more than whether particular psychological
or physical requirements are met, seems to be the more appropriate
goal of will formalities.
171. See supra Sections I.A.1-2.
172. See supra note 26 (describing requirements under Wills Act).
173. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Section I.B.
176. See supra Section I.D.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF WILLS FORMALITIES
The law is moving and likely will continue to move in the direction
of recognizing wills that are "written" in electronic form only."' In
2017, the Uniform Law Commission took the unusual step of
establishing a drafting committee for an Electronic Wills Act without
first engaging in the typical study phase that precedes any drafting
project.178 This suggests that law reformers perceive an urgent need to
bring the practice of wills into the twenty-first century, and to square
historic requirements for the execution of wills with the realities of life
in the twenty-first century.179 In order to plan for the future, the
traditional purposes of wills formalities demand critical investigation.
By letting go of conventional platitudes about the cautionary, ritual,
protective, and channeling function of wills, it may be possible to
articulate a more nuanced understanding of the substantive goals served
by wills formalities. With that knowledge, one can then begin to
consider how twenty-first century technology might be employed to
revolutionize will execution, without jeopardizing any of the security
that is fundamental for a functional legal system of succession.
One technology with particular promise for safeguarding and
verifying documents such as wills is a distributed ledger that allows
transactions to be recorded and validated electronically. 80 The details
of how this technology might apply to testamentary instruments merits
more rigorous inquiry, but the basic concept is this: as long as there is
177. See, e.g., In re Estate of Castro, No. 2013ES00140 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
Prob. Div. June 19, 2013) (permitting probate of will of electronic will signed by stylus
on Samsung Galaxy tablet computer); see also Nichol v. Nichol [2017] QSC 200
(Supreme Court in Queensland, Australia allowing probate on an unsent text message as
decedent's last will and testament); and Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2003) (permitting probate of a will where testator affixed a computer-generated,
cursive style signature at the end of the document in the presence of two witnesses, and
witnesses then signed their names to the will). But see Litevich v. Probate Court, 2013
WL 2945055 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 17, 2013) (unpublished opinion) (denying probate
of will prepared via paid online drafting service Legalzoom and unsigned by testator
with no evidence that any witnesses present at any relevant time).
178. See Memorandum from Suzy Walsh, Turney Berry & Susan Gary to
Electronic Wills Drafting Committee (Oct. 2, 2017); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION: ELECTRONIC WILLS
ACT (2018); Fla. Electronic Wills Act, Fla. H.B. 277, 119th Sess. (2017).
179. See also Fla. Electronic Wills Act, Fla. H.B. 277, 119th Sess. (2017) and
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar, White Paper on
Proposed Enactment of the Florida Electronic Wills Act 7,
https://www.flprobatelitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/206/2017/05[RPPTL-
Electronic-Wills-Act-White-Paper-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CNU-5XN2] (noting
absence of study phase for project and warning that a "change to the law as substantial
as this demands a careful and well-studied approach").
180. See Bridget J. Crawford, Blockchain Wills, IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract= 3346493.
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clear and convincing proof that a particular document was the document
signed-whether electronically or not-by the testator and intended to
be the testator's will-that document should be given legal effect."'
In the short term, the possibility of electronic wills and
technology-based verification systems draw attention away from the
fundamental proposal of this Article: wills should be simpler to
execute. Eventually, though, as technology develops and becomes more
widespread, looser legal standards combined with technological
advances may allow execution of a valid will to be as simple as sending
an email. Contemplating such a future forces an honest discussion of
the ways that traditional wills formalities have not in fact functioned as
generations of scholars have claimed. That is, even when presented
with a document in writing that has been signed by the testator and
attested by witnesses,18 wills nevrtheless have been vulnerable to
attack on the grounds of fraud,183 undue influence,18 duress, 85 or lack
of mental capacity.' The fact that compliance with wills formalities
does not preclude these challenges suggests that the formalities are
doing something other than what they claim. The real work of
formalities appears to be authentication and nothing more. 187
CONCLUSION
How and why a society facilitates the transfer of wealth reveals a
tremendous amount about that society's values. If the overarching
principle of the law of succession in the United States is the freedom of
disposition, as the Restatement (Third) of Property states,' then the
lawyers, as primary architects and custodians of the legal system, must
strive for laws that facilitate, rather than impede, a testator's desires for
the distribution of his property. By requiring simply a showing that a
document is the decedent's authentic will for it to be probated, more
people would be able to execute valid estate planning documents. And
if lawyers can incorporate twenty-first century technologies into their
practices to allow electronic wills, that eventually may make execution
of a will as simple as sending an email or completing an online form.
181. Id.
182. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.3(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (defining fraud).
184. § 8.3(b) (defining undue influence).
185. § 8.3(c) (defining duress).
186. See, e.g., § 8.1(b) (stating standard for mental capacity); 95 C.J.S. Wills
§ 7 (2018) (defining testamentary capacity generally).
187. See supra Part III.
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
293
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Current wills formalities do not serve their stated purposes, but
emerging technologies hold the potential to address the concerns that
undergird the stated cautionary, protective, evidentiary, and channeling
functions of wills formalities. 18 9 Just as important oaths are no longer
taken while gripping genitalia and real property transfers do not require
boxing the ears of children,1" there is nothing immutable about the
historic or present-day wills formalities. Any change that makes estate
planning more available to a greater number of people should be
embraced and welcomed.
189. See Crawford, supra note 180.
190. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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